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Introduction and summary
The last 15 years have seen a revolution in the way
financial economists understand the investment world.
We once thought that stock and bond returns were
essentially unpredictable. Now we recognize that
stock and bond returns have a substantial predictable
component at long horizons. We once thought that
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) provided a
good description of why average returns on some
stocks, portfolios, funds, or strategies were higher than
others. Now we recognize that the average returns of
many investment opportunities cannot be explained
by the CAPM, and multifactor models are used in
its place. We once thought that long-term interest
rates reflected expectations of future short-term rates
and that interest rate differentials across countries
reflected expectations of exchange rate depreciation.
Now, we see time-varying risk premiums in bond and
foreign exchange markets as well as in stock markets.
We once thought that mutual fund average returns
were well explained by the CAPM. Now, we see that
funds can earn average returns not explained by the
CAPM, that is, unrelated to market risks, by following
a variety of investment styles.
In this article, I survey these new facts, and I show
how they are variations on a common theme. Each
case uses price variables to infer market expectations
of future returns; each case notices that an offsetting
adjustment (to dividends, interest rates, or exchange
rates) seems to be absent or sluggish. Each case sug-
gests that financial markets offer rewards in the form
of average returns for holding risks related to reces-
sions and financial distress, in addition to the risks
represented by overall market movements. In a com-
panion article in this issue, Portfolio advice for a mul-
tifactor world, I survey and interpret recent advances
in portfolio theory that address the question, What
should an investor do about all these new facts?
First, a slightly more detailed overview of the
facts then and now. Until the mid-1980s, financial
economists view of the investment world was based
on three bedrocks:
1. The CAPM is a good measure of risk and thus
a good explanation of the fact that some assets (stocks,
portfolios, strategies, or mutual funds) earn higher
average returns than others. The CAPM states that
assets can only earn a high average return if they
have a high beta, which measures the tendency
of the individual asset to move up or down with the
market as a whole. Beta drives average returns because
beta measures how much adding a bit of the asset to
a diversified portfolio increases the volatility of the
portfolio. Investors care about portfolio returns, not
about the behavior of specific assets.
2. Returns are unpredictable, like a coin flip. This
is the random walk theory of stock prices. Though
there are bull and bear markets; long sequences of
good and bad past returns; the expected future return
is always about the same. Technical analysis that
tries to divine future returns from patterns of past
returns and prices is nearly useless. Any apparent
predictability is either a statistical artifact which will
quickly vanish out of sample or cannot be exploited
after transaction costs.
Bond returns are not predictable. This is the
expectations model of the term structure. If long-term
bond yields are higher than short-term yieldsif the
yield curve is upward slopingthis does not mean
that you expect a higher return by holding long-term
bonds rather than short-term bonds. Rather, it means37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
that short-term interest rates are expected to rise in
the future. Over one year, the rise in interest rates will
limit the capital gain on long-term bonds, so they earn
the same as the short-term bonds over the year. Over
many years, the rise in short rates improves the rate
of return from rolling over short-term bonds to equal
that of holding the long-term bond. Thus, you expect
to earn about the same amount on short-term or long-
term bonds at any horizon.
Foreign exchange bets are not predictable. If a
country has higher interest rates than are available in
the U.S. for bonds of a similar risk class, its exchange
rate is expected to depreciate. Then, after you con-
vert your investment back to dollars, you expect to
make the same amount of money holding foreign or
domestic bonds.
In addition, stock market volatility does not
change much through time. Not only are returns close
to unpredictable, they are nearly identically distributed
as well. Each day, the stock market return is like the
result of flipping the same coin, over and over again.
3. Professional managers do not reliably outper-
form simple indexes and passive portfolios once one
corrects for risk (beta). While some do better than the
market in any given year, some do worse, and the
outcomes look very much like luck. Funds that do well
in one year are not more likely to do better than aver-
age the next year. The average actively managed fund
performs about 1 percent worse than the market index.
The more actively a fund trades, the lower the returns
to investors.
Together, these views reflect a guiding principle
that asset markets are, to a good approximation, infor-
mationally efficient (Fama, 1970, 1991). Market prices
already contain most information about fundamental
value and, because the business of discovering infor-
mation about the value of traded assets is extremely
competitive, there are no easy quick profits to be made,
just as there are not in any other well-established
and competitive industry. The only way to earn large
returns is by taking on additional risk.
These views are not ideological or doctrinaire
beliefs. Rather, they summarize the findings of a quar-
ter century of careful empirical work. However, every
one of them has now been extensively revised by a
new generation of empirical research. The new find-
ings need not overturn the cherished view that markets
are reasonably competitive and, therefore, reasonably
efficient. However, they do substantially enlarge our
view of what activities provide rewards for holding
risks, and they challenge our understanding of those
risk premiums.
Now, we know that:
1. There are assets whose average returns can
not be explained by their beta. Multifactor extensions
of the CAPM dominate the description, performance
attribution, and explanation of average returns. Mul-
tifactor models associate high average returns with a
tendency to move with other risk factors in addition
to movements in the market as a whole. (See box 1.)
2. Returns are predictable. In particular: Variables
including the dividend/price (d/p) ratio and term pre-
mium can predict substantial amounts of stock return
variation. This phenomenon occurs over business
cycle and longer horizons. Daily, weekly, and monthly
stock returns are still close to unpredictable, and tech-
nical systems for predicting such movements are still
close to useless.
Bond returns are predictable. Though the expec-
tations model works well in the long run, a steeply
upward sloping yield curve means that expected
returns on long-term bonds are higher than on short-
term bonds for the next year. These predictions are not
guaranteesthere is still substantial riskbut the
tendency is discernible.
Foreign exchange returns are predictable. If you
put your money in a country whose interest rates are
higher than usual relative to the U.S., you expect to
earn more money even after converting back to dollars.
Again, this prediction is not a guaranteeexchange
rates do vary, and a lot, so the strategy is risky.
Volatility does change through time. Times of
past volatility indicate future volatility. Volatility also
is higher after large price drops. Bond market volatili-
ty is higher when interest rates are higher, and possi-
bly when interest rate spreads are higher as well.
3. Some mutual funds seem to outperform simple
indexes, even after controlling for risk through market
betas. Fund returns are also slightly predictable: Past
winning funds seem to do better than average in the
future, and past losing funds seem to do worse than
average in the future. For a while, this seemed to indi-
cate that there is some persistent skill in active man-
agement. However, multifactor models explain most
fund persistence: Funds earn persistent returns by
following fairly mechanical styles, not by persistent
skill at stock selection.
Again, these statements are not dogma, but a
cautious summary of a large body of careful empirical
work. The strength and usefulness of many results
are hotly debated, as are the underlying reasons for
many of these new facts. But the old world is gone.38 Economic Perspectives
The CAPM and multifactor models
The CAPM
The CAPM proved stunningly successful in a
quarter century of empirical work. Every strategy that
seemed to give high average returns turned out to
have a high beta, or a large tendency to move with
the market. Strategies that one might have thought
gave high average returns (such as holding very vol-
atile stocks) turned out not to have high average
returns when they did not have high betas.
Figure 1 presents a typical evaluation of the
CAPM. I examine 10 portfolios of NYSE stocks sorted
by size (total market capitalization), along with a port-
folio of corporate bonds and long-term government
bonds. As the vertical axis shows, there is a sizable
spread in average returns between large stocks (lower
average return) and small stocks (higher average
return) and a large spread between stocks and bonds.
The figure plots these average returns against market
betas. You can see how the CAPM prediction fits: Port-
folios with higher average returns have higher betas.
In fact, figure 1 captures one of the first signifi-
cant failures of the CAPM. The smallest firms (the far
right portfolio) seem to earn an average return a few
percent too high given their betas. This is the cele-
brated small-firm effect, (Banz, 1981) and this devi-
ation is statistically significant. Would that all failed
economic theories worked so well! However, the plot
shows that this effect is within the range that statisti-
cians can argue about. Estimating the slope of the
line by fitting a cross-sectional regression (average
return against beta), shown in the colored line, rather
than forcing the line to go through the market and
Treasury bill return, shown in the black line, halves
BOX 1
The CAPM and multifactor models
The CAPM uses a time-series regression to mea-
sure beta, b, which quantifies an assets or portfo-
lios tendency to move with the market as a whole,
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Multifactor models extend this theory in a
straightforward way. They use a time-series multi-
ple regression to quantify an assets tendency to
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FIGURE 1
CAPMMean excess returns vs. beta, version 1
mean excess returns, percent
Fitted market premium
Notes: Average returns versus betas on the NYSE value-weighted
portfolio for ten size-sorted stock portfolios, government bonds,
and corporate bonds. Sample period 1947–96. The black line
draws the CAPM prediction by fitting the market proxy and
Treasury bill rates exactly (a time-series test) and the colored line
draws the CAPM prediction by fitting an OLS cross-sectional
regression to the displayed data points (a second-pass or cross-
sectional test). The small-firm portfolios are at the top right.
Moving down and to the left, one sees increasingly large-firm
portfolios and the market index. The points far down and to the
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the small-firm effect. Figure 2 uses the equally weighted
portfolio as market proxy, and this change in specifica-
tion eliminates the small-firm effect, making the line of
average returns versus betas if anything too shallow
rather than too steep.
Why we expect multiple factors
In retrospect, it is surprising that the CAPM
worked so well for so long. The assumptions on which
it is built are very stylized and simplified. Asset pricing
theory recognized at least since Merton (1973, 1971)
the theoretical possibility, indeed probability, that we
should need factors, state variables or sources of
priced risk, beyond movements in the market portfo-
lio to explain why some average returns are higher
than others. (See box 1 for details of the CAPM and
multifactor models.)
Most importantly, the average investor has a
job. The CAPM (together with the use of the NYSE
portfolio as the market proxy) simplifies matters by
assuming that the average investor only cares about
the performance of his investment portfolio. While
there are investors like that, for most of us eventual
wealth comes both from investment and from earning
a living. Importantly, events like recessions hurt the
majority of investors. Those who dont actually lose
jobs get lower salaries or bonuses. A very limited num-
ber of people actually do better in a recession.
With this fact in mind, compare two stocks. They
both have the same sensitivity to market movements.
However, one of them does well in recessions, while
the other does poorly. Clearly, most investors prefer
the stock that does well in recessions, since its perfor-
mance will cushion the blows to their other income.
If lots of people feel that way, they bid up the price of
that stock, or, equivalently, they are willing to hold it
at a lower average return. Conversely, the procyclical
stocks price will fall or it must offer a higher average
return in order to get investors to hold it.
In sum, we should expect that procyclical stocks
that do well in booms and worse in recessions will have
to offer higher average returns than countercyclical
stocks that do well in recessions, even if the stocks
have the same market beta. We expect that another
dimension of riskcovariation with recessions
will matter in determining average returns.1
What kinds of additional factors should we look
for? Generally, asset pricing theory specifies that
assets will have to pay high average returns if they
do poorly in bad timestimes in which investors
would particularly like their investments not to perform
badly and are willing to sacrifice some expected return
in order to ensure that this is so. Consumption (or,
more generally, marginal utility) should provide the
purest measure of bad times. Investors consume less
when their income prospects are low or if they think
future returns will be bad. Low consumption thus
reveals that this is indeed a time at which investors
would especially like portfolios not to do badly, and
would be willing to pay to ensure that wish. Alas,
efforts to relate asset returns to consumption data
are not (yet) a great success. Therefore, empirically
useful asset pricing models examine more direct mea-
sures of good times or bad times. Broad categories
of such indicators are
1. The market return. The CAPM is usually
included and extended. People are unhappy if the
market crashes.
2. Events, such as recessions, that drive inves-
tors noninvestment sources of income.
3. Variables, such as the p/d ratio or slope of
the yield curve, that forecast stock or bond returns
(called state variables for changing investment
opportunity sets).
4. Returns on other well-diversified portfolios.
One formally justifies the first three factors by
stating assumptions under which each variable is re-
lated to average consumption. For example, 1) if the
market as a whole declines, consumers lose wealth
and will cut back on consumption; 2) if a recession
leads people to lose their jobs, then they will cut back
on consumption; and, 3) if you are saving for retire-
ment, then news that interest rates and average stock
returns have declined is bad news, which will cause
you to lower consumption. This last point establishes
a connection between predictability of returns and the
presence of additional risk factors for understanding
FIGURE 2
CAPMMean excess returns vs. beta, version 2
mean excess returns, percent
Direct market premium
Notes: CAPM using the equally weighted NYSE as the “market
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the cross-section of average returns. As pointed out
by Merton (1971), one would give up some average
return to have a portfolio that did well when there
was bad news about future market returns.
The fourth kind of factoradditional portfolio
returnsis most easily defended as a proxy for any of
the other three. The fitted value of a regression of any
pricing factor on the set of all asset returns is a portfo-
lio that carries exactly the same pricing information as
the original factora factor-mimicking portfolio.
It is vital that the extra risk factors affect the
average investor. If an event makes investor A worse
off and investor B better off, then investor A buys
assets that do well when the event happens and inves-
tor B sells them. They transfer the risk of the event,
but the price or expected return of the asset is unaf-
fected. For a factor to affect prices or expected returns,
it must affect the average investor, so investors collec-
tively bid up or down the price and expected return of
assets that covary with the event rather than just trans-
ferring the risk without affecting equilibrium prices.
Inspired by this broad direction, empirical research-
ers have found quite a number of specific factors that
seem to explain the variation in average returns across
assets. In general, empirical success varies inversely
with theoretical purity.
Small and value/growth stocks
The size and book to market factors advocated
by Fama and French (1996) are one of the most popu-
lar additional risk factors.
Small-cap stocks have small market values (price
times shares outstanding). Value (or high book/market)
stocks have market values that are small relative to
the value of assets on the companys books. Both
categories of stocks have quite high average returns.
Large and growth stocks are the opposite of small
and value and seem to have unusually low average
returns. (See Fama and French, 1993, for a review.)
The idea that low prices lead to high average returns
is natural.
High average returns are consistent with the
CAPM, if these categories of stocks have high sensi-
tivity to the market, high betas. However, small and
especially value stocks seem to have abnormally
high returns even after accounting for market beta. Con-
versely, growth stocks seem to do systematically worse
than their CAPM betas suggest. Figure 3 shows this
valuesize puzzle. It is just like figure 1, except that the
stocks are sorted into portfolios based on size and
book/market ratio2 rather than size alone. The highest
portfolios have three times the average excess return
of the lowest portfolios, and this variation has nothing
at all to do with market betas.
In figure 4, I connect portfolios of different sizes
within the same book/market category (panel A). Vari-
ation in size produces a variation in average returns
that is positively related to variation in market betas,
as shown in figure 1. In panel B, I connect portfolios
that have different book/market ratios within size cat-
egories. Variation in book/market ratio produces a
variation in average return that is negatively related to
market beta. Because of this value effect, the CAPM is
a disaster when confronted with these portfolios.
To explain these facts, Fama and French (1993,
1996) advocate a multifactor model with the market
return, the return of small less big stocks (SMB), and
the return of high book/market less low book/market
stocks (HML) as three factors. They show that varia-
tion in average returns of the 25 size and book/market
portfolios can be explained by varying loadings (betas)
on the latter two factors.
Figure 5 illustrates Fama and Frenchs results.
As in figure 4, the vertical axis is the average returns
of the 25 size and book/market portfolios. Now, the
horizontal axis is the predicted values from the Fama
French three-factor model. The points should all lie
on a 45 degree line if the model is correct. The points
lie much closer to this prediction in figure 5 than in
figures 3 and 4. The worst fit is for the growth stocks
(lowest line, panel A), for which there is little variation
in average return despite large variation in size beta
as one moves from small to large firms.
What are the size and value factors?
One would like to understand the real, macroeco-
nomic, aggregate, nondiversifiable risk that is proxied
by the returns of the HML and SMB portfolios. Why
FIGURE 3
Mean excess returns vs. market beta,
FamaFrench portfolios
mean excess returns
Notes: Average monthly returns versus market beta for 25 stock
portfolios sorted on the basis of size and book/market ratio.
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are investors so concerned about holding stocks that
do badly at the times that the HML (value less growth)
and SMB (small-cap less large-cap) portfolios do badly,
even though the market does not fall? The answer to
this question is not yet totally clear.
Fama and French (1995) note that the typical value
stock has a price that has been driven down due to
financial distress. The stocks of firms on the verge
of bankruptcy have recovered more often than not,
which generates the high average returns of this
strategy.3 This observation suggests a natural inter-
pretation of the value premium: In the event of a credit
crunch, liquidity crunch, or flight to quality, stocks in
financial distress will do very badly, and this is pre-
cisely when investors least want to hear that their port-
folio is losing money. (One cannot count the distress
of the individual firm as a risk factor. Such distress
is idiosyncratic and can be diversified away. Only
aggregate events that average investors care about
can result in a risk premium.)
FIGURE 4
mean excess return
Mean excess returns vs. market beta, varying size and book/market ratio
A. Changing size within book/market category
Notes: Average returns versus market beta for 25 stock portfolios sorted on the basis of size and book/market ratio.
The points are the same as figure 3. In panel A, lines connect portfolios as size varies within book/market categories;
in panel B, lines connect portfolios as book/market ratio varies within size categories.
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FIGURE 5
actual mean excess return, E(Ri – Rf)
Mean excess return vs. three-factor model predictions
 A. Changing size within book/market category
Notes: Average returns versus market beta for 25 stock portfolios sorted on the basis of size and book/market ratio versus
predictions of Fama–French three-factor model. The predictions are derived by regressing each of the 25 portfolio returns, R
i
t,
on the market portfolio, R
m
t , and the two Fama–French factor portfolios, SMBt (small minus big) and HMLt (high minus low
book/market). (See equation 4 in box 1.)
actual mean excess return, E(Ri – Rf)
B. Changing book/market within size category
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Heaton and Lucass (1997) results add to this
story for the value effect. They note that the typical
stockholder is the proprietor of a small, privately held
business. Such an investors income is, of course,
particularly sensitive to the kinds of financial events
that cause distress among small firms and distressed
value firms. Therefore, this investor would demand a
substantial premium to hold value stocks and would
hold growth stocks despite a low premium.
Liew and Vassalou (1999), among others, link value
and small-firm returns to macroeconomic events. They
find that in many countries, counterparts to HML and
SMB contain supplementary information to that con-
tained in the market return for forecasting gross domes-
tic product (GDP) growth. For example, they report
a regression
GDPt®t+4 = a + 0.065 MKTt4® t
                              + 0.058 HMLt4® t +  et+4,
where GDPt®t+4 denotes the following years GDP
growth and MKTt4®t and HMLt4®t denote the previous
years return on the market index and HML portfolio.
Thus, a 10 percent HML return raises the GDP forecast
by 0.5 percentage points. (Both coefficients are signifi-
cant with t-statistics of 3.09 and 2.83, respectively.)
The effects are still under investigation. Figure 6
plots the cumulative return on the HML and SMB
portfolios; a link between these returns and obvious
macroeconomic events does not jump out. Both port-
folios have essentially no correlation with the market
return, though HML does seem to move inversely with
large market declines. HML goes down more than the
market in some business cycles, but less in others.
On the other hand, one can ignore Fama and
Frenchs motivation and regard the model as an arbi-
trage pricing theory (APT) following Ross (1976). If
the returns of the 25 size and book/market portfolios
could be perfectly replicated by the returns of the
three-factor portfoliosif the R2 values in the time-
series regressions of the 25 portfolio on the three
factors were 100 percentthen the multifactor model
would have to hold exactly, in order to preclude arbi-
trage opportunities. To see this, suppose that one of
the 25 portfolioscall it portfolio Agives an average
return 5 percent above the average return predicted
by the FamaFrench model, and its R2 is 100 percent.
Then, one could short a combination of the three-
factor portfolios, buy portfolio A, and earn a completely
riskless profit. This logic is often used to argue that
a high R2 should imply an approximate multifactor
model. If the R2 were only 95 percent, then an average
return 5 percent above the factor model prediction
would imply that the strategy long portfolio A and
short a combination of the three-factor portfolios
would earn a very high average return with very little,
though not zero, riska very high Sharpe ratio.
In fact, the R2 values of Fama and Frenchs (1993)
time-series regressions are all in the 90 percent to 95
percent range, so extremely high risk prices for the
residuals would have to be invoked for the model not
to fit well. Conversely, given the average returns from
HML and SMB and the failure of the CAPM to explain
those returns, there would be near-arbitrage opportu-
nities if value and small stocks did not move together
in the way described by the FamaFrench model.
One way to assess whether the three factors
proxy for real macroeconomic risks is by checking
whether the multifactor model prices additional port-
folios, especially portfolios whose ex-post returns are
not well explained by the factors (portfolios that do
not have high R2 values in time-series regressions).
Fama and French (1996) find that the SMB and HML
portfolios comfortably explain strategies based on
alternative price multiples (price/earnings, book/market),
five-year sales growth (this is the only strategy that
does not form portfolios based on price variables),
and the tendency of five-year returns to reverse. All
of these strategies are not explained by CAPM betas.
However, they all also produce portfolios with high
R2 values in a time-series regression on the HML and
SMB portfolios. This is good and bad news. It might
FIGURE 6
Cumulative returns on market portfolios
cumulative return
Notes: Cumulative returns on the market RMRF, SMB, and
HML portfolios. The SMB return is formed by R
TB
t  + aSMBt;
a = s(RMRF)/s(SMB). In this way it is a return that can be
cumulated rather than a zero-cost portfolio, and its standard
deviation is equal to that of the market return. HML is adjusted
similarly. The vertical axis is the log base 2 of the cumulative
return or value of $1 invested at the beginning of the sample
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mean that the model is a good APT, and that the size
and book/market characteristics describe the major
sources of priced variation in all stocks. On the other
hand, it might mean that these extra ways of construct-
ing portfolios just havent identified other sources of
priced variation in stock returns. (Fama and French,
1996, also find that HML and SMB do not explain
momentum, despite high R2 values. I discuss this
anomaly below.) The portfolios of stocks sorted by
industry in Fama and French (1997) have lower R2
values, and the model works less well.
A final concern is that the size and book/market
premiums seem to have diminished substantially in
recent years. The sharp decline in the SMB portfolio
return around 1980 when the small-firm effect was first
popularized is obvious in figure 6. In Fama and Frenchs
(1993) initial samples, 196090, the HML cumulative
return starts about one-half (0.62) below the market
and ends up about one-half (0.77) above the market.
On the log scale of the figure, this corresponds to Fama
and Frenchs report that the HML average return is
about double (precisely, 20.62+0.77 = 2.6 times) that of
the market. However, over the entire sample of the
plot, the HML portfolio starts and ends at the same
place and so earns almost exactly the same as the
market. From 1990 to now, the HML portfolio loses
about one-half relative to the market, meaning an inves-
tor in the market has increased his money one and a
half times as much as an HML investor. (The actual
number is 0.77 so the market return is 20.77 = 1.71 times
better than the HML return.)
Among other worries, if the average returns decline
right after publication it suggests that the anomalies
may simply have been overlooked by a large fraction
of investors. As they move in, prices go up further,
helping the apparent anomaly for a while. But once a
large number of investors have moved in to include
small and value stocks in their portfolios, the anoma-
lous high average returns disappear.
However, average returns are hard to measure.
There have been previous ten- to 20-year periods in
which small stocks did very badly, for example the
1950s, and similar decade-long variations in the HML
premium. Also, since SMB and HML have a beta of
essentially zero on the market, any upward trend is a
violation of the CAPM and says that investors can
improve their overall meanvariance tradeoff by taking
on some of the HML or SMB portfolio.
Macroeconomic factors
I focus on the size and value factors because they
provide the most empirically successful multifactor
model and have attracted much industry as well as
academic attention. Several authors have used macro-
economic variables as factors. This procedure examines
directly whether stock performance during bad macro-
economic times determines average returns. Jagan-
nathan and Wang (1996) and Reyfman (1997) use
labor income; Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) look at
industrial production and inflation among other vari-
ables; and Cochrane (1996) looks at investment growth.
All these authors find that average returns line up
with betas calculated using the macroeconomic indica-
tors. The factors are theoretically easier to motivate,
but none explains the value and size portfolios as
well as the (theoretically less solid, so far) size and
value factors.
Mertons (1973, 1971) theory says that variables
which predict market returns should show up as fac-
tors that explain cross-sectional variation in average
returns. Campbell (1996) is the lone test I know of to
directly address this question. Cochrane (1996) and
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) perform related tests in
that they include scaled return factors, for example,
market return at t multiplied by d/p ratio at t  1; they
find that these factors are also important in under-
standing cross-sectional variation in average returns.
The next step is to link these more fundamentally
determined factors with the empirically more success-
ful value and small-firm factor portfolios. Because of
measurement difficulties and selection biases, funda-
mentally determined macroeconomic factors will never
approach the empirical performance of portfolio-based
factors. However, they may help to explain which port-
folio-based factors really work and why.
Predictable returns
The view that risky asset returns are largely unpre-
dictable, or that prices follow random walks, remains
immensely successful ( Malkiel, 1990, is a classic and
readable introduction). It is also widely ignored.
Unpredictable returns mean that if stocks went
up yesterday, there is no exploitable tendency for them
to decline today because of profit taking or to contin-
ue to rise today because of momentum. Technical
signals, including analysis of past price movements
trading volume, open interest, and so on are close to
useless for forecasting short-term gains and losses.
As I write, value funds are reportedly suffering large
outflows because their stocks have done poorly in
the last few months, leading fund investors to move
money into blue-chip funds that have performed bet-
ter (New York Times Company, 1999). Unpredictable
returns mean that this strategy will not do anything
for investors portfolios over the long run except rack
up trading costs. If funds are selling stocks, then44 Economic Perspectives
contrarian investors must be buying them, but un-
predictable returns mean that this strategy can not
improve performance either. If one can not system-
atically make money, one can not systematically
lose money either.
As discussed in the introduction, researchers
once believed that stock returns (more precisely, the
excess returns on stocks over short-term interest
rates) were completely unpredictable. It now turns
out that average returns on the market and individual
securities do vary over time and that stock returns
are predictable. Alas for would-be technical traders,
much of that predictability comes at long horizons
and seems to be associated with business cycles and
financial distress.
Market returns
Table 1 presents a regression that forecasts re-
turns. Low pricesrelative to dividends, book value,
earnings, sales, or other divisorspredict higher sub-
sequent returns. As the R2 values in table 1 show,
these are long-horizon effects: Annual returns are
only slightly predictable and month-to-month returns
are still strikingly unpredictable, but returns at five-year
horizons seem very predictable. (Fama and French, 1989,
is an excellent reference for this kind of regression).
The results at different horizons are reflections
of a single underlying phenomenon. If daily returns
are very slightly predictable by a slow-moving vari-
able, that predictability adds up over long horizons.
For example, you can predict that the temperature in
Chicago will rise about one-third of a degree per day
in spring. This forecast explains very little of the day
to day variation in temperature, but tracks almost all
of the rise in temperature from January to July. Thus,
the R2 rises with horizon.
Precisely, suppose that we forecast returns with



















Small values of b and R2 in equation 1 and a large
coefficient r in equation 2 imply mathematically that
the long-horizon regression as in table 1 has a large
regression coefficient b and large R2.
This regression has a powerful implication: Stocks
are in many ways like bonds. Any bond investor un-
derstands that a string of good past returns that push-
es the price up is bad news for subsequent returns.
Many stock investors see a string of good past returns
and become elated that we seem to be in a bull
market, concluding future stock returns will be good
as well. The regression reveals the opposite: A string
of good past returns which drives up stock prices
is bad news for subsequent stock returns, as it is
for bonds.
Long-horizon return predictability was first doc-
umented in the volatility tests of Shiller (1981) and
LeRoy and Porter (1981). They found that stock pric-
es vary far too much to be accounted for by chang-
ing expectations of subsequent cash flows; thus
changing discount rates or expected returns must
account for variation in stock prices. These volatility
tests turn out to be almost identical to regressions
such as those in table 1 (Cochrane, 1991).
Momentum and reversal
Since a string of good returns gives a high price,
it is not surprising that individual stocks that do
well for a long time (and reach a high price) subse-
quently do poorly, and stocks that do poorly for a
long time (and reach a low price, market value, or mar-
ket to book ratio) subsequently do well. Table 2, taken
from Fama and French (1996) confirms this hunch.
(Also, see DeBont and Thaler, 1985, and Jegadeesh
and Titman, 1993.)
The first row in table 2 tracks the average monthly
return from the reversal strategy. Each month, allocate
all stocks to ten portfolios based on performance
from year 5 to year 1. Then, buy the best-perform-
ing portfolio and short the worst-performing portfolio.
This strategy earns a hefty 0.74 percent monthly
return.4 Past long-term losers come back and past
winners do badly. Fama and French (1996) verify that
these portfolio returns are explained by their three-
factor model. Past winners move with value stocks,
TABLE 1
OLS regression of excess returns on
price/dividend ratio
Horizon k  b  Standard error R2
1 year –1.04 0.33  0.17
2 years –2.04 0.66 0.26
3 years –2.84 0.88 0.38
5 years –6.22 1.24 0.59
Notes: OLS regressions of excess returns (value-weighted
NYSE–Treasury bill rate) on value-weighted price/dividend
ratio.
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and so inherit the value stock premium. (To compare
the strategies, the table always buys the winners and
shorts the losers. In practice, of course, you buy the
losers and short the winners to earn +0.71 percent
monthly average return.)
The second row of table 2 tracks the average
monthly return from a momentum strategy. Each
month, allocate all stocks to ten portfolios based on
performance in the last year. Now, the winners con-
tinue to win and the losers continue to lose, so that
buying the winners and shorting the losers generates
a positive 1.31 percent monthly return.
Momentum is not explained by the FamaFrench
(1996) three-factor model. The past losers have low
prices and tend to move with value stocks. Hence, the
model predicts that they should have high average
returns, not low average returns.
Momentum stocks move together, as do value
and small stocks, so a momentum factor works to
explain momentum portfolio returns (Carhart, 1997).
This step is so obviously ad hoc (that is, an APT fac-
tor that will only explain returns of portfolios orga-
nized on the same characteristic as the factor rather
than a proxy for macroeconomic risk) that most peo-
ple are uncomfortable adding it. We obviously do not
want to add a new factor for every anomaly.
Is momentum really there, and if so, is it exploitable
after transaction costs? One warning is that it does not
seem stable over subsamples. The third and fourth
lines in table 2 show that the momentum effect essen-
tially disappears in the earlier data sample, while reversal
is even stronger in that sample.
Momentum is really just a new way of looking at
an old phenomenon, the small apparent predictability
of monthly individual stock returns. A tiny regression
R2 for forecasting monthly returns of 0.0025 (0.25 per-
cent) is more than adequate to generate the momentum
results of table 2. The key is the large
standard deviation of individual stock
returns, typically 40 percent or more on
an annual basis. The average return of
the best performing decile of a normal
distribution is 1.76 standard deviations
above the mean,5 so the winning momen-
tum portfolio went up about 80 percent
in the previous year and the typical los-
ing portfolio went down about 60
percent. Only a small amount of continu-
ation will give a 1 percent monthly return
when multiplied by such large past
returns. To be precise, the monthly indi-
vidual stock standard deviation is about
40% 12 12%. / £ If the R2 is 0.0025,
 the standard deviation of the predict-
able part of returns is  .. 0025 12% 06%. ￿£  Hence,
the decile predicted to perform best will earn
176 06% 1% .. ￿£ above the mean. Since the strategy
buys the winners and shorts the losers, an R2 of
0.0025 implies that one should earn a 2 percent monthly
return by the momentum strategy.
We have known at least since Fama (1965) that
monthly and higher frequency stock returns have
slight, statistically significant predictability with R2
about 0.01. Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, table
2.4) provide an updated summary of index autocorrela-
tions (the R2 is the squared autocorrelation), part of
which I show in table 3. Note the correlation of the equal-
ly weighted portfolio, which emphasizes small stocks.6
However, such small, though statistically signifi-
cant, high-frequency predictability has thus far failed
to yield exploitable profits after one takes into account
transaction costs, thin trading of small stocks, and
high short-sale costs. The momentum strategy for ex-
ploiting this correlation may not work in practice for
the same reasons. Momentum does require frequent
trading. The portfolios in table 2 are re-formed every
TABLE 2
Average monthly returns, reversal and momentum strategies
Portfolio Average
Strategy Period formation return, 10–1
(months) (monthly %)
Reversal July 1963–Dec. 1993 60–13 –0.74
Momentum July 1963–Dec. 1993 12–2 +1.31
Reversal Jan. 1931–Feb. 1963 60–13 –1.61
Momentum Jan. 1931–Feb. 1963 12–2 +0.38
Notes: Each month, allocate all NYSE firms to 10 portfolios
based on their performance during the “portfolio formation months”
interval. For example, 60–13 forms portfolios based on returns from 5
years ago to 1 year, 1 month ago. Then buy the best-performing decile
portfolio and short the worst-performing decile portfolio.
Source: Fama and French (1996, table 6).
TABLE 3
First-order autocorrelation, CRSP value- and
equally weighted index returns






Source: Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997).46 Economic Perspectives
month. Annual winners and losers will not change
that often, but the winning and losing portfolio must
be turned over at least once per year. In a quantitative
examination of this effect, Carhart (1997) concludes
that momentum is not exploitable after transaction
costs are taken into account. Moskowitz and Grinblatt
(1999) note that most of the apparent gains from the
momentum strategy come from short positions in
small illiquid stocks. They also find that a large part
of momentum profits come from short positions taken
in November. Many investors sell losing stocks toward
the end of December to establish tax losses. By short-
ing illiquid losing stocks in November, an investor
can profit from the selling pressure in December. This
is also an anomaly, but it seems like a glitch rather than
a central principle of risk and return in asset markets.
Even if momentum and reversal are real and as
strong as indicated by table 2, they do not justify much
of the trading based on past results that many inves-
tors seem to do. To get the 1 percent per month
momentum return, one buys a portfolio that has typi-
cally gone up 80 percent in the last year, and shorts a
portfolio that has typically gone down 60 percent.
Trading between stocks and fund categories such as
value and blue-chip with smaller past returns yields
at best proportionally smaller results. Since much of
the momentum return seems to come from shorting
small illiquid stocks, mild momentum strategies may
yield even less. And we have not quantified the sub-
stantial risk of momentum strategies.
Bonds
The venerable expectations model of the term
structure specifies that long-term bond yields are
equal to the average of expected future short-term bond
yields (see box 2). For example, if long-term bond yields
are higher than short-term bond yieldsif the yield
curve is upward slopingthis means that short-term
rates are expected to rise in the future. The rise in fu-
ture short-term rates means that investors can expect
BOX 2
Bond definitions and expectations hypothesis
Let  pt
N ()  denote the log of the N year discount
bond price at time t. The N period continuously
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The continuously compounded holding period
return is the selling price less the buying price,








1 () ( ) () . The forward rate is the rate
at which an investor can contract today to borrow
money N  1 years from now, and repay that money
N years from now. Since an investor can synthe-
size a forward contract from discount bonds, the
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 The spot rate refers, by contrast with a for-
ward rate, to the yield on any bond for which the
investor take immediate delivery. Forward rates
are typically higher than spot rates when the yield
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The expectations hypothesis states that the
expected log or continuously compounded return
should be the same for any bond strategy. This
statement has three mathematically equivalent
expressions:
1. The forward rate should equal the expected
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2. The expected holding period return should be
the same on bonds of any maturity
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3. The long-term bond yield should equal the
average of the expected future short rates,
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The expectations hypothesis is often amend-
ed to allow a constant risk premium of undeter-
mined sign in these equations. Its violation is then
often described as evidence for a time-varying
risk premium.
The expectations hypothesis is not quite the
same thing as risk-neutrality, because the expected
log return is not equal to the log expected return.
However, the issues here are larger than the differ-
ence between the expectations hypothesis and
strict risk-neutrality.47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
the same rate of return whether they hold a long-term
bond to maturity or roll over short-term bonds with
initially low returns and subsequent higher returns.
As with the CAPM and the view that stock returns
are independent over time, a new round of research
has significantly modified this traditional view of
bond markets.
Table 4 calculates the average return on bonds
of different maturities. The expectations hypothesis
seems to do pretty well. Average holding period returns
do not seem very different across bond maturities,
despite the increasing standard deviation of longer-
maturity bond returns. The small increase in average
returns for long-term bonds, equivalent to a slight
average upward slope in the yield curve, is usually
excused as a liquidity premium. Table 4 is just the
tip of an iceberg of successes for the expectations
model. Especially in times of significant inflation and
exchange rate instability, the expectations hypothesis
has done a very good first-order job of explaining the
term structure of interest rates.
However, if there are times when long-term bonds
are expected to do better and other times when short-
term bonds are expected to do better, the unconditional
averages in table 4 could still show no pattern. Simi-
larly, one might want to check whether a forward rate
that is unusually high forecasts an unusual increase
in spot rates.
Table 5 updates Fama and Blisss (1987) classic
regression tests of this idea. Panel A presents a regres-
sion of the change in yields on the forward-spot
spread. (The forward-spot spread measures the slope
of the yield curve.) The expectations hypothesis pre-
dicts a slope coefficient of 1.0, since the forward rate
should equal the expected future spot rate. If, for
example, forward rates are lower than expected future
spot rates, traders can lock in a borrowing position
with a forward contract and then lend at the higher
spot rate when the time comes.
Instead, at a one-year horizon we find slope co-
efficients near zero and a negative adjusted R2. For-
ward rates one year out seem to have no predictive
power whatsoever for changes in the spot rate one
year from now. On the other hand, by four years out,
we see slope coefficients within one standard error of
1.0. Thus, the expectations hypothesis seems to do
poorly at short (one-year) horizons, but much better
at longer horizons.
If the expectations hypothesis does not work at
one-year horizons, then there is money to be made
one must be able to foresee years in which short-term
bonds will return more than long-term bonds and vice
versa, at least to some extent. To confirm this implica-
tion, panel B of table 5 runs regressions of the one-year
excess return on long-term bonds on the forward-
spot spread. Here, the expectations hypothesis pre-
dicts a coefficient of zero: No signal (including the
TABLE 4
Zero-coupon bond returns
Maturity Average holding Standard Standard
N period return error deviation
1 5.83 0.42 2.83
2 6.15 0.54 3.65
3 6.40 0.69 4.66
4 6.40 0.85 5.71
5 6.36 0.98 6.58
Note: Continuously compounded one-year holding period
returns on zero-coupon bonds of varying maturity. Annual
data from CRSP 1953–97.
TABLE 5
Forecasts based on forward-spot spread
A. Change in yields B. Holding period returns
Standard Standard Standard Standard
error, error, Adjusted error, error, Adjusted
N Intercept intercept Slope slope R2 Intercept  intercept Slope slope R2
1 0.10 0.3 –0.10 0.36 –0.020 –0.1 0.3 1.10 0.36 0.16
2 –0.01 0.4 0.37 0.33 0.005 –0.5 0.5 1.46 0.44 0.19
3 –0.04 0.5 0.41 0.33 0.013 –0.4 0.8 1.30 0.54 0.10
4 –0.30 0.5 0.77 0.31 0.110 –0.5 1.0 1.31 0.63 0.07
Notes: OLS regressions, 1953–97 annual data. Panel A estimates the regression y (1)
      t+n – yt
(1) = a +b (ft
(N+1)  – yt
(1)) + e  t+N
and panel B estimates the regression hpr (N)
t+1
 –yt
(1) = a + b (f t
(N+1)  – y (1)
t  ) + e   t+1, where yt
(N) denotes the N-year bond yield at
date t; ft
(N) denotes the N-period ahead forward rate; and hpr (N
t+
)
1 denotes the one-year holding period return at date t + 1
on an N-year bond. Yields and returns in annual percentages.48 Economic Perspectives
forward-spot spread) should be able to tell you that
this is a particularly good time for long bonds versus
short bonds, as the random walk view of stock prices
says that no signal should be able to tell you that
this is a particularly good or bad day for stocks versus
bonds. However, the coefficients in panel B are all
about 1.0. A high forward rate does not indicate that
interest rates will be higher one year from now; it
seems to indicate that investors will earn that much
more by holding long-term bonds.7
Of course, there is risk. The R2 values are all 0.1
0.2, about the same values as the R2 from the d/p re-
gression at a one-year horizon, so this strategy will
often go wrong. Still, 0.10.2 is not zero, so the strat-
egy does pay off more often than not, in violation of
the expectations hypothesis. Furthermore, the for-
ward-spot spread is a slow-moving variable, typically
reversing sign once per business cycle. Thus, the R2
builds with horizon as with the d/p regression, peak-
ing in the 30 percent range (Fama and French, 1989).
Foreign exchange
Suppose interest rates are higher in Germany
than in the U.S. Does this mean that one can earn
more money by investing in German bonds? There
are several reasons that the answer might be no.
First, of course, is default risk. Governments have
defaulted on bonds in the past and may do so again.
Second, and more important, is the risk of devalua-
tion. If German interest rates are 10 percent and U.S.
interest rates are 5 percent, but the euro falls 5 per-
cent relative to the dollar during the year, you make
no more money holding the German bonds
despite their attractive interest rate. Since
lots of investors are making this calcula-
tion, it is natural to conclude that an inter-
est rate differential across countries on
bonds of similar credit risk should reveal
an expectation of currency devaluation.
The logic is exactly the same as that of the
expectations hypothesis in the term struc-
ture. Initially attractive yield or interest rate
differentials should be met by an offsetting
event so that you make no more money
on average in one maturity or currency
versus another.8
As with the expectations hypothesis
in the term structure, the expected depreci-
ation view still constitutes an important
first-order understanding of interest rate
differentials and exchange rates. For exam-
ple, interest rates in east Asian currencies
were very high on the eve of the recent
currency tumbles, and many banks were
making tidy sums borrowing at 5 percent in dollars to
lend at 20 percent in local currencies. This suggests
that traders were anticipating a 15 percent devalua-
tion, or a smaller chance of a larger devaluation, which
is exactly what happened. Many observers attribute
high nominal interest rates in troubled economies to
tight monetary policy aimed at defending the cur-
rency. In reality, high nominal rates reflect a large prob-
ability of inflation and devaluationloose monetary
policyand correspond to much lower real rates.
Still, does a 5 percent interest rate differential
correspond to a 5 percent expected depreciation, or
does some of it represent a high expected return from
holding debt in that countrys currency? Further-
more, while expected depreciation is clearly a large
part of the interest rate story in high-inflation econo-
mies, how does the story play out in economies like
the U.S. and Germany, where inflation rates diverge
little but exchange rates still fluctuate a large amount?
The first row of table 6 (from Hodrick, 2000, and
Engel, 1996) shows the average appreciation of the
dollar against the indicated currency over the sample
period. The dollar fell against the deutschemark, yen,
and Swiss franc, but appreciated against the pound
sterling. The second row gives the average interest
rate differentialthe amount by which the foreign
interest rate exceeds the U.S. interest rate.9 Accord-
ing to the expectations hypothesis, these two num-
bers should be equalinterest rates should be





mark sterling Yen franc
Mean appreciation –1.8 3.6 –5.0 –3.0
Mean interest differential –3.9 2.1 –3.7 –5.9
b, 1975–89 –3.1 –2.0 –2.1 –2.6
R2 .026 .033 .034 .033
b, 1976–96 –0.7 –1.8 –2.4 –1.3
b, 10-year horizon 0.8 0.6 0.5 –
Notes: The first row gives the average appreciation of the dollar against the
indicated currency, in percent per year. The second row gives the average
interest differential—foreign interest rate less domestic interest rate,
measured as the forward premium—the 30-day forward rate less the spot
exchange rate. The third through sixth rows give the coefficients and R2 in a
regression of exchange rate changes on the interest differential,
st+1 – st = a + b (rt
f – rt
d) +  et+1,
where s = log spot exchange rate, rf = foreign interest rate, and
rd = domestic interest rate.
Source: Hodrick (2000), Engel (1996), and Meredith and Chinn (1998).49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The second row shows roughly the expected pat-
tern. Countries with steady long-term inflation have
steadily higher interest rates and steady depreciation.
The numbers in the first and second rows are not
exactly the same, but exchange rates are notoriously
volatile so these averages are not well measured. Ho-
drick (2000) shows that the difference between the
first and second rows is not statistically different
from zero. This fact is analogous to the evidence in
table 4 that the expectations hypothesis works well
on average for U.S. bonds.
As in the case of bonds, however, we can ask
whether times of temporarily higher or lower interest
rate differentials correspond to times of above- and
below-average depreciation as they should. The third
and fifth rows of table 6 update Famas (1984) regres-
sion tests. The number here should be +1.0 in each
case1 percentage point extra interest differential
should correspond to 1 percentage point extra ex-
pected depreciation. On the contrary, as table 6 shows,
a higher than usual interest rate abroad seems to lead
to further appreciation. This is the forward discount
puzzle. See Engel (1996) and Lewis (1995) for recent
surveys of the avalanche of academic work investigat-
ing whether this puzzle is really there and why.
The R2 values shown in table 6 are quite low.
However, like d/p and the term spread, the interest dif-
ferential is a slow-moving forecasting variable, so the
return forecast R2 builds with horizon. Bekaert and
Hodrick (1992) report that the R2 rises to the 30 percent
to 40 percent range at six-month horizons and then
declines. Thats high, but not 100 percent; taking
advantage of any predictability strategy is quite risky.
The puzzle does not say that one earns more by
holding bonds from countries with higher interest
rates than others. Average inflation, depreciation,
and interest rate differentials line up as they should.
The puzzle does say that one earns more by holding
bonds from countries whose interest rates are higher
than usual relative to U.S. interest rates (and vice
versa). The fact that the usual rate of depreciation
and interest differential changes through time will, of
course, diminish the out-of-sample performance of
these trading rules.
One might expect that exchange rate depreciation
works better for long-run exchange rates, as the expec-
tations hypothesis works better for long-run interest
rate changes. The last row of table 6, taken from
Meredith and Chinn (1998) verifies that this is so.
Ten-year exchange rate changes are correctly forecast
by the interest differentials of ten-year bonds.
Mutual funds
Studying the returns of funds that follow a spe-
cific strategy gives us a way to assess whether that
strategy works in practice, after transaction costs
and other trading realities are taken into account.
Studying the returns of actively managed funds tells
us whether the time, talent, and effort put into picking
securities pays off. Most of the literature on evaluating
fund performance is devoted to the latter question.
A large body of empirical work, starting with
Jensen (1969), finds that actively managed funds, on
average, underperform the market index. I use data
from Carhart (1997), whose measures of fund perfor-
mance account for survivor bias. Survivor bias arises
because funds that do badly go out of business.
Therefore, the average fund that is alive at any point
in time has an artificially good track record.
As with the stock portfolios in figure 1, the fund
data in figure 7 show a definite correlation between
beta and average return: Funds that did well took on
more market risks. A cross-sectional regression line is
a bit flatter than the line drawn through the Treasury
bill and market return, but this is a typical result of
measurement error in the betas. (The data are annual,
and many funds are only around for a few years, con-
tributing to beta measurement error.) The average fund
underperforms the line connecting Treasury bills and
the market index by 1.23 percent per year (that is, the
average alpha is 1.23 percent).
The wide dispersion in fund average returns in
figure 7 is a bit surprising. Average returns vary across
funds almost as much as they do across individual
stocks. This fact implies that the majority of funds
are not holding well-diversified portfolios that would
reduce return variation, but rather are loading up on
specific bets.
Initially, the fact that the average fund underper-
forms the market seems beside the point. Perhaps the
average fund is bad, but we want to know whether
the good funds are any good. The trouble is, we must
somehow distinguish skill from luck. The only way
to separate skill from luck is to group funds based
on some ex-ante observable characteristic, and then
examine the average performance of the group. Of
course, skillful funds should have done better, on
average, in the past, and should continue to do better
in the future. Thus, if there is skill in stock picking,
we should see some persistence in fund performance.
However, a generation of empirical work found no per-
sistence at all. Funds that did well in the past were no
more likely to do well in the future.50 Economic Perspectives
Since the average fund underperforms the market,
and fund returns are not predictable, we conclude
that active management does not generate superior
performance, especially after transaction costs and
fees. This fact is surprising. Professionals in almost
any field do better than amateurs. One would expect
that a trained experienced professional who spends
all day reading about markets and stocks should be
able to outperform simple indexing strategies. Even if
entry into the industry is so easy that the average
fund does not outperform simple indexes one would
expect a few stars to outperform year after year, as
good teams win championship after championship.
Alas, the contrary fact is the result of practically every
investigation, and even the anomalous results docu-
ment very small effects.
Funds and value
Given the value, small-firm, and predictability
effects, the idea that funds cluster around the market
line is quite surprising. All of these new facts imply
inescapably that there are simple, mechanical strate-
gies that can give a risk/reward ratio greater than that
of buying and holding the market index. Fama and
French (1993) report that the HML port-
folio alone gives nearly double the market
Sharpe ratiothe same average return at
half the standard deviation. Why dont
funds cluster around a risk/reward line
significantly above the markets?
Of course, we should not expect all
funds to cluster around a higher risk/re-
ward tradeoff. The average investor
holds the market, and if funds are large
enough, so must the average fund. Index
funds, of course, will perform like the in-
dex. Still, the typical actively managed
fund advertises high mean and, perhaps,
low variance. No fund advertises cutting
average returns in half to spare investors
exposure to nonmarket sources of risk.
Such funds, apparently aimed at mean
variance investors, should cluster
around the highest risk/reward tradeoff
available from mechanical strategies
(and more, if active management does
any good). Most troubling, funds who
say they follow value strategies dont
outperform the market either. For example,
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992,
table 3) find that the average value fund
underperforms the S&P500 by 1 percent
just like all the others.
We can resolve this contradiction if
we think that fund managers were simply unaware of
the possibilities offered by our new facts, and so
(despite the advertising) were not really following
them. That seems to be the implication of figure 7,
which sorts funds by their HML beta. One would ex-
pect the high-HML beta funds to outperform the mar-
ket line. But the cutoff for the top one-third of funds
is only a HML beta of 0.3, and even that may be high
(many funds dont last long, so betas are poorly mea-
sured; the distribution of measured betas is wider
than the actual distribution). Thus, the value funds
were really not following the value strategy that
earns the HML returns; if they were doing so they
would have HML betas of 1.0. Similarly, Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishnys (1992) documentation of value
funds underperformance reveals that their market
beta is close to 1.0. These results imply that value
funds are not really following a value strategy, since
their returns correlate with the market portfolio and not
the value portfolio.
Interestingly, the number of value and small-cap
funds (as revealed by their betas, not their marketing
claims) is increasing quickly. Before 1990, 14 percent
of funds had measured SMB betas greater than 1.0,
FIGURE 7
Average returns of mutual funds vs. market betas
average return
Notes: Average returns of mutual funds over the Treasury bill rate versus their
market betas. Sample consists of all funds with average total net assets
greater than $25 million and more than 25 percent of their assets in stocks,
in the Carhart (1996) database. Data sample 1962–96. The average excess
return is computed as E(Ri– Rf ) = ai + bi  x 9%. ai and bi are computed from a
time-series regression of fund annual excess returns on market annual excess
returns over the life of the fund. The o, +, and x labels in the figure sort funds
into thirds based on their regression coefficient h on the Fama–French value
(HML) portfolio. The breakpoints are h = –0.084, 0.34. The dashed line gives
the fit of a cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression of ai on bi ; The
solid line connects the Treasury bill (b and excess return = 0) and the market
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and 12 percent had HML betas greater than 1.0. In
the full sample, both numbers have doubled to 22
percent and 23 percent. This trend suggests that
funds will, in the future, be much less well described
by the market index.
The view that funds were unaware of value strat-
egies, and are now moving quickly to exploit them,
can explain why most funds still earn near the market
return, rather than the higher value return. However,
this view contradicts the view that the value premium
is an equilibrium risk premium, that is, that everyone
knew about the value returns but chose not to invest
all along because they feared the risks of value strat-
egies. If it is not an equilibrium risk premium, it wont
last long.
Persistence in fund returns
The fund counterpart to momentum in stock re-
turns has been more extensively investigated than
the value and size effects. Fund returns have also
been found to be persistent. Since such persistence
can be interpreted as evidence for persistent skill in
picking stocks, it is not surprising that it has attract-
ed a great deal of attention, starting with Hendricks,
Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993).
Table 7, taken from Carhart (1997), shows that a
portfolio of the best-performing one-thirtieth of funds
last year outperforms a portfolio of the worst-perform-
ing one-thirtieth of funds by 1 percent per month
(column 2). This is about the same size as the momen-
tum effect in stocks, and similarly results from a small
autocorrelation plus a large standard deviation in
individual fund returns. This result verifies that mutual
fund performance is persistent.
Perhaps the funds that did well took on more
market risks, raising their betas and, hence, average
returns in the following year. The third column in table
7 shows that this is not the case. The cross-sectional
variation in fund average returns has nothing to do
with market betas. Just as in the case of individual
stock returns, we have to understand fund returns
with multifactor models, if at all.
The last column of table 7 presents alphas (inter-
cepts, the part of average return not explained by the
model) from a model with four factorsthe market,
the FamaFrench HML and SMB factors, and a momen-
tum factor, PR1YR, that is long NYSE stocks that did
well in the last year and short NYSE stocks that did
poorly in the last year. In general, one should object
to the inclusion of so many factors and such ad-hoc
factors. However, this is a performance attribution
rather than an economic explanation use of a multi-
factor model. We want to know whether fund perfor-
mance, and persistence in fund performance in
particular, is due to persistent stock-picking skill or
to mechanical strategies that investors could just as
easily follow on their own, without paying the man-
agement costs associated with investing through a
fund. For this purpose, it does not matter whether the
factors represent true, underlying sources of macro-
economic risks.
The alphas in the last column of table 7 are almost
all about 1 percent to 2 percent per year negative. Thus,
Carharts model explains that the persistence in fund
performance is due to persistence in the
underlying stocks, not persistent stock-
picking skill. These results support the
old conclusion that actively managed
funds underperform mechanical indexing
strategies. There is some remaining puz-
zling persistence, but it is all in the large
negative alphas of the bottom one-tenth
to bottom one-thirtieth of performers,
which lose money year after year. Car-
hart also shows that the persistence of
fund performance is due to momentum in
the underlying stocks, rather than mo-
mentum funds. If, by good luck, a fund
happened to pick stocks that went up
last year, the portfolio will continue to
go up a bit this year.
In sum, the new research does noth-
ing to dispel the disappointing view of
active management. However, we dis-
cover that passively managed style
TABLE 7
Portfolios of mutual funds formed on previous years return
Average 4-factor
Last year rank return CAPM alpha alpha
( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  percent   -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -)
1/30 0.75 0.27 –0.11
1/10 0.68 0.22 –0.12
5/10 0.38 –0.05 –0.14
9/10 0.23 –0.21 –0.20
10/10 0.01 –0.45 –0.40
30/30 –0.25 –0.74 –0.64
Notes: Each year, mutual funds are sorted into portfolios based on the
previous year’s return. The rank column gives the rank of the selected
portfolio. For example, 1/30 is the best performing portfolio when funds are
divided into 30 categories. Average return gives the average monthly return
in excess of the T-bill rate of this portfolio of funds for the following year.
Four-factor alpha gives the average return less the predictions of a
multifactor model that uses the market, the Fama–French HML and SMB
portfolios, and portfolio PR1YR which is long NYSE stocks that did well in
the last year and short NYSE stocks that did poorly in the last year.
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portfolios can earn returns that are not explained by
the CAPM.
Catastrophe insurance
A number of prominent funds have earned very
good returns (and others, spectacular losses) by fol-
lowing strategies such as convergence trades and
implicit put options. These strategies may also reflect
high average returns as compensation for nonmarket
dimensions of risk. They have not been examined at
the same level of detail as the value and small-cap
strategies, so I offer a possible interpretation rather
than a documented one.
Convergence trades take strong positions in very
similar securities that have small price differences.
For example, a 29.5-year Treasury bond typically
trades at a slightly higher yield (lower price) than a
30-year Treasury bond. (This was the most famous
bet placed by LTCM. See Lewis, 1999.) A convergence
trade puts a strong short position on the expensive
security and a strong long position on the cheap secu-
rity. This strategy is often mislabeled an arbitrage.
However, the securities are similar, not identical. The
spread between 29.5- and 30-year Treasury bonds
reflects the lower liquidity of the shorter maturity
and the associated difficulty of selling it in a financial
panic. It is possible for this spread to widen. Nonethe-
less, panics are rare, and the average returns in
all the years when they do not happen may more than
make up for the spectacular losses when they do.
Put options protect investors from large price
declines. The volatility smile in put option prices
reflects the surprisingly high prices of such options,
compared with the small probability of large market
collapses (even when one calibrates the probability
directly, rather than using the log-normal distribution
of the BlackScholes formula). Writers of out-of-the-
money puts collect a fee every month; in a rare market
collapse they will pay out a huge sum, but if the proba-
bility of the collapse is small enough, the average
returns may be quite good.
All of these strategies can be thought of as catas-
trophe insurance (Hsieh and Fung, 1999). Most of
the time they earn a small premium. Once in a great
while they lose a lot, and they lose a lot in times of
financial catastrophe, when most investors are really
anxious that the value of their investments not evap-
orate. Therefore, it is economically plausible that
these strategies can earn positive average returns,
even when we account for stock market risk via the
CAPM and we correctly measure the small probabilities
of large losses.
The difficulty in empirically estimating the true
average return of such strategies, of course, is that
rare events are rare. Many long samples will give a
false sense of security because the big one that
justifies the premium happened not to hit.
The value, yield curve, and foreign exchange
strategies I survey above also exhibit features of
catastrophe insurance. Value stocks may earn high
returns because distressed stocks will all go bankrupt
in a financial panic. Buying bonds of countries with
high interest rates leaves one open to the small chance
of a large devaluation, and such devaluation is
especially likely to happen in a global financial panic.
Similarly, buying long-term bonds in the depth of a
recession when the yield curve is upward sloping
may expose one to a small risk of a large inflation.
If these interpretations bear out, they also sug-
gest that the premiumsthe average returns from
holding stocks sensitive to HML or from following
the bond and foreign exchange strategiesmay be
overstated in the data. The markets have had an unusu-
ally good 50 years, and devastating financial
panics have not happened.
Implications of the new facts
While the list of new facts appears long, similar
patterns show up in every case. Prices reveal slow-
moving market expectations of subsequent returns,
because potential offsetting events seem sluggish
or absent. The patterns suggest that investors can
earn substantial average returns by taking on the
risks of recession and financial stress. In addition,
there is a small positive autocorrelation of high-
frequency returns.
The effects are not completely new. We have
known since the 1960s that high-frequency returns
are slightly predictable, with R2 of 0.01 to 0.1 in daily
to monthly returns. These effects were dismissed
because there didnt seem to be much one could do
about them. A 51/49 bet is not very attractive, especial-
ly if there is any transaction cost. Also, the increased
Sharpe ratio (mean excess return/standard deviation)
from exploiting predictability is directly related to the
forecast R2, so a tiny R2, even if exploitable, did not
seem important. Now, we have a greater understand-
ing of the potential importance of these effects and
their economic interpretations.
For price effects, we now realize that the R2 rises
with horizon when the forecasting variables are slow-
moving. Hence, a small R2 at short horizons can mean a
really substantial R2 in the 30 percent to 50 percent
range at longer horizons. Also, the nature of these
effects suggests the kinds of additional sources of
priced risk that theorists had anticipated for 20 years.
For momentum effects, the ability to sort stocks and53 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
funds into momentum-based portfolios means that very
small predictability times portfolios with huge past re-
turns gives important subsequent returns, though it is
not totally clear that this amplification of the small pre-
dictability really does survive transaction costs.
Price-based forecasts
If expected returns rise, prices are driven down,
since future dividends or other cash flows are discount-
ed at a higher rate. A low price, then, can reveal a mar-
ket expectation of a high expected or required return.10
Most of our results come from this effect. Low
price/dividend, price/earnings, or price/book values
signal times when the market as a whole will have high
average returns. Low market value (price times shares)
relative to book value signals securities or portfolios
that earn high average returns. The small-firm ef-
fect derives from low pricesother measures of size
such as number of employees or book value alone
have no predictive power for returns (Berk, 1997).
The five-year reversal effect derives from the fact
that five years of poor returns lead to a low price. A
high long-term bond yield means that the price of long-
term bonds is low, and this seems to signal a time
of good long-term bond returns. A high foreign inter-
est rate means a low price on foreign bonds, and this
seems to indicate good returns on the foreign bonds.
The most natural interpretation of all these effects
is that the expected or required returnthe risk pre-
miumon individual securities as well as the market
as a whole varies slowly over time. Thus we can track
market expectations of returns by watching price/div-
idend, price/earnings, or book/market ratios.
Absent offsetting events
In each case, an apparent difference in yield
should give rise to an offsetting movement, but does
not seem to do so. Something should be predictable
so that returns are not predictable, and it is not. Figure
8 provides a picture of the results in table 5. Suppose
that the yield curve is upward sloping as in panel A.
What does this mean? If the expectations model were
true, the forward rates plotted against maturity would
translate one for one to the forecast of future spot
rates in panel B, as plotted in the black line marked
Expectations model. A high long-term bond yield
relative to short-term bond yields should not mean a
higher expected long-term bond return. Subsequent
short rates should rise, cutting off the one-period
advantage of long-term bonds and raising the multi-
year advantage of short-term bonds.
In figure 8, panel b, the colored line marked Esti-
mates shows the actual forecast of future spot inter-
est rates from the results in table 5. The essence of the
phenomenon is sluggish adjustment of the short
rates. The short rates do eventually rise to meet the
forward rate forecasts, but not as quickly as the for-
ward rates predict they should. Short-term yields
should be forecastable so that returns are not fore-
castable. In fact, yields are almost unforecastable,
so, mechanically, bond returns are. The roughly 1.0
coefficients in panel B of table 5 mean that a 1 per-
centage point increase in the forward rate translates
into a 1 percentage point increase in expected return.
It seems that old fallacy of confusing bond yields
with their expected returns for the first year contains
a grain of truth.
FIGURE 8
percent
Yield curve and forecast one-year interest rates
A. Current yield curve
forecast interest rate


















Notes: Assuming that the current yield curve is as shown in panel A, the black line in panel
B gives the forecast from the expectations hypothesis, in which case forward rates today are
the forecast of future spot rates. The colored line in panel B gives the actual forecast of future






In the same way, a high dividend yield on a stock
or portfolio should mean that dividends grow more
slowly over time, or, for individual stocks, that the firm
has taken on more market risk and will have a higher
market beta. These tendencies seem to be completely
absent. Dividend/price ratios do not seem to forecast
dividend growth and, hence, (mechanically) they
forecast returns. The one-year coefficient in table 1 is
very close to 1.00, meaning that a 1 percentage point
increase in the dividend yield translates into a 1 per-
centage point increase in return. It seems that the old
fallacy of confusing increased dividend yield with in-
creased total return does contain a grain of truth.
A high foreign interest rate relative to domestic
interest rates should not mean a higher expected re-
turn. We should see, on average, an offsetting depre-
ciation. But here, the coefficients are even larger than
1.0. An interest rate differential seems to predict a fur-
ther appreciation. It seems that the old fallacy of
confusing interest rate differentials across countries
with expected returns, forgetting about depreciation,
also contains a grain of truth.
Economic interpretation
The price-based predictability patterns suggest
a premium for holding risks related to recession and
economy-wide financial distress. Stock and bond pre-
dictability are linked: The term spread (forward-spot,
or long yieldshort yield) forecasts stock returns as
well as bond returns (Fama and French, 1989). Fur-
thermore, the term spread is one of the best variables
for forecasting business cycles. It rises steeply at the
bottom of recessions and is inverted at the top of a
boom. Return forecasts are high at the bottom of a
business cycle and low at the top of a boom. Value
and small-cap stocks are typically distressed. Empiri-
cally successful economic models of the recession and
distress premiums are still in their infancy (Campbell
and Cochrane, 1999, is a start), but the story is at
least plausible and the effects have been expected
by theorists for a generation.
To make this point come to life, think concretely
about what you have to do to take advantage of the
predictability strategies. You have to buy stocks or
long-term bonds at the bottom, when stock prices are
low after a long and depressing bear market, in the
bottom of a recession or the peak of a financial panic.
This is a time when few people have the guts or the
wallet to buy risky stocks or risky long-term bonds.
Looking across stocks rather than over time, you have
to invest in value or small-cap companies, with years
of poor past returns, poor sales, or on the edge of
bankruptcy. You have to buy stocks that everyone
else thinks are dogs. Then, you have to sell stocks
and long-term bonds in good times, when stock prices
are high relative to dividends, earnings, and other
multiples and the yield curve is flat or inverted so
that long-term bond prices are high. You have to sell
the popular growth stocks, with good past returns,
good sales, and earnings growth.
You have to sell now, and the stocks that you
should sell are the blue-chips that everyone else seems
to be buying. In fact, the market timing strategies said
to sell long ago; if you did so, you would have missed
much of the runup in the Dow past the 6,000 point. Val-
ue stocks too have missed most of the recent market
runup. However, this shouldnt worry youa strategy
that holds risks uncorrelated with the market must un-
derperform the market close to half of the time.
If this feels uncomfortable, what youre feeling
is risk. If youre uncomfortable watching the market
pass you by, perhaps you dont really only care about
long-run mean and variance; you also care about
doing well when the market is doing well. If you want
to stay fully invested in stocks, perhaps you too feel
the time-varying aversion to or exposure to risk that
drives the average investor to stay fully invested
despite low prospective returns.
This line of explanation for the foreign exchange
puzzle is still a bit farther off (see Engel, 1996, for a
survey; Atkeson, Alvarez, and Kehoe, 1999, offer a
recent stab at an explanation). The strategy leads in-
vestors to invest in countries with high interest rates.
High interest rates are often a sign of monetary insta-
bility or other economic trouble, and thus may mean
that the investments are more exposed to the risks of
global financial stress or a global recession than are
investments in the bonds of countries with low interest
rates, which are typically enjoying better times.
Return correlation
Momentum and persistent fund performance
explained by a momentum factor are different from the
price-based predictability results. In both cases, the
underlying phenomenon is a small predictability of
high-frequency returns. The price-based predictabili-
ty strategies make this predictability important by
showing that, with a slow-moving forecasting variable,
the R2 builds over horizon. Momentum, however, is
based on a fast-moving forecast variablethe previ-
ous years return. Therefore, the R2 declines rather
than building with horizon. Momentum makes the
small predictability of high-frequency returns signifi-
cant in a different way, by forming portfolios of extreme
winners and losers. The large volatility of returns means
that the extreme portfolios will have extreme past
returns, so only a small continuation of past returns
gives a large current return.55 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
It would be appealing to understand momentum
as a reflection of slowly time-varying average expected
returns or risk premiums, like the price-based predict-
ability strategies. If a stocks average return rises for
a while, that should make returns higher both today
and tomorrow. Thus, a portfolio of past winners will
contain more than its share of stocks that performed
well because their average returns were higher, along
with stocks that performed well due to luck. The
average return of such a portfolio should be higher
tomorrow as well.
Unfortunately, this story has to posit a substan-
tially different view of the underlying process for
varying expected returns than is needed to explain
everything else. The trouble is that a surprise increase
in expected returns means that prices will fall, since
dividends are now discounted at a greater rate. This
is the phenomenon we have relied on to explain why
low price/dividend, price/earnings, book/market,
value, and size forecast higher subsequent returns.
Therefore, positive correlation of expected returns
typically yields a negative correlation of realized
returns. To get a positive correlation of realized returns
out of slow expected return variation, you have to
imagine that an increase in average returns today is
either highly correlated with a decrease in expected
future dividend growth or with a decrease in expected
returns in the distant future (an impulse response
that starts positive but is negative at long horizons).
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) provide a quan-
titative exposition of these effects.
Furthermore, momentum returns have not yet
been linked to business cycles or financial distress in
even the informal way that I suggested for price-based
strategies. Thus, momentum still lacks a plausible
economic interpretation. To me, this adds weight to
the view that it isnt there, it isnt exploitable, or it
represents a small illiquidity (tax-loss selling of small
illiquid stocks) that will be quickly remedied once a
few traders understand it.
Remaining doubts
The size of all these effects is still somewhat
in question. It is always hard to measure average
returns of risky strategies. The standard formula
s / T  for the standard error of the mean, together
with the high volatility s of any strategy, means that
one needs 25 years of data to even start to measure
average returns. With s = 16 percent (typical of the
index), even T = 25 years means that one standard
error is 16/5 @ 3 percent per year, and a two-standard
error confidence interval runs plus or minus 6 percent-
age points. This is not much smaller than the average
returns we are trying to measure. In addition, all of
these facts are highly influenced by the small proba-
bility of rare events, which makes measuring average
returns even harder.
Finally, viewed the right way, we have very few
data points with which to evaluate predictability. The
term premium and interest rate differentials only change
sign with the business cycle, and the dividend/price
ratio only crosses its mean once every generation.
The history of interest rates and inflation in the U.S.
is dominated by the increase, through two recessions,
to a peak in 1980 and then a slow decline after that.
Many of the anomalous risk premiums seem to
be declining over time. Figure 6 shows the decline in
the HML and SMB premiums, and the same may be
true of the predictability effects. The last three years
of high market returns have cut the estimated return
predictability from the dividend/price ratio in half.
This fact suggests that at least some of the premium
the new strategies yielded in the past was due to the
fact that they were simply overlooked.
Was it really clear to average investors in 1947 or
1963 (the beginning of the data samples) that stocks
would earn 9 percent over bonds, and that the strate-
gy of buying distressed small stocks would double
even that return for the same level of risk? Would av-
erage investors have changed their portfolios with this
knowledge? Or would they have stayed pat, explain-
ing that these returns are earned as a reward for risk
that they were not willing to take? Was it clear that
buying stocks at the bottom in the mid-1970s would
yield so much more than even that high average re-
turn? If we interpret the premiums measured in sam-
ple as true risk premiums, the answer must be yes.
If the answer is no, then at least some part of the
premium was luck and will disappear in the future.
Since the premiums are hard to measure, one is
tempted to put less emphasis on them. However, they
are crucial to our interpretation of the facts. The
CAPM is perfectly consistent with the fact that there
are additional sources of common variation. For ex-
ample, it was long understood that stocks in the same
industry move together; the fact that value or small
stocks also move together need not cause a ripple.
The surprise is that investors seem to earn an average
return premium for holding these additional sources
of common movement, whereas the CAPM predicts
that (given beta) they should have no effect on a
portfolios average returns.
The behavior of funds also suggests the over-
looked strategy interpretation. As explained earlier,
fund returns still cluster around the market line. It turns
out that very few fund returns actually followed the
value or other return-enhancing strategies. However,
the number of small, value, and related fundsfunds56 Economic Perspectives
that actually do follow the strategieshas increased
dramatically in recent years. It might be possible to
explain this in a way consistent with the idea that in-
vestors knew the premiums were there all along, but
such an argument is obviously strained.
Conclusion
In sum, it now seems that investors can earn a
substantial premium for holding dimensions of risk
unrelated to market movements, such as recession-
related or distress-related risk. Investors earn these
premiums by following strategies, such as value and
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